Should judges or others be concerned with empirical work? Judge Harry Edwards has sought to "debunk the myth that ideology is a principal determinant in decision making." He dislikes the "heedless observations of academic scholars who misconstrue and misunderstand the work of judges," and their "so-called 'empirical studies'." See Edwards, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1335 (1998). Charles Grover Haines once wrote, "The results showing to what extent justice is affected by personality of the judge were so startling and so disconcerting that it seemed advisable to discontinue the comparative tables of the records of the justices." 17 Ill. L. Rev. 96 (1922). Perhaps, in order to alleviate any concerns, we, as scholars, must do a better judge explaining how our empirical findings might help us better evaluate and possibly improve the judicial process (e.g., judicial selection methods, how to select judicial panels, the costs and benefits of certain interpretive philosophies, etc.). Comments are open.