Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court
Edited by James R. Rogers, Roy B. Flemming, and Jon R. Bond
(University of Virginia Press)
Available: Approximately Today
Contributors: Kenneth A. Shepsle, Andrew De Martin, James R. Rogers, Christopher Zorn, Georg Vanberg, Cliff Carrubba, Thomas Hammond, Christopher Bonneau, Reginald Sheehan, Charles Cameron, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Matthew Stephenson, Stefanie A. Lindquist, Susan D. Haire, and Lawrence Baum
From the Description:
Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis
of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new
insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory
highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other
institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among
the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices’
votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come
to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to sophisticated
behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with
constraints on their ability to do so…. James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon
Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's
interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways
of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the
volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential
interactions among various branches of the U.S. government.
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