A few years ago, I had a long conversation with the one of
the legal academy’s most successful scholars. During this exchange, he/she opined that the study of rankings was a mere
pastime for legal academics--albeit a pastime he/she quite enjoyed--rather than a topic that warranted the sustained attention of serious scholars. Since I was writing my
contribution to the “Next Generation of Law School Ranking” at the time, I
remember thinking to myself how strange it was that a rigorous analysis of the “800-pound
gorilla” of legal education, chocked full of practical policy suggestions, was
ipso facto less weighty than an article read by a handful of specialists.
Although I agree that my colleague accurately conveyed the prevailing wisdom, I have gradually concluded that the low-brow status of rankings research has more to do with the norms of the academy than the larger enterprise of knowledge creation. Moreover, an ostrich-like approach to our changing times has huge risks that are irresponsible to ignore. For these reasons, I am now willing to openly defend the value and significance of so-called “rankings
scholarship.”
The study of rankings is primarily the study of markets
within a multi-billion dollar legal education and legal services industry. Rankings scholarship owes its existence to
the rapid proliferation of information, made available by U.S. News and other sources, to evaluate the relative benefits of a
3-year, $100,000+ investment. This
development has gradually eroded away the cartel-like control over legal
education enjoyed by several organizations that historically have been very
friendly to—or in some cases, staffed by—legal educators.
This transition period is loaded with incentives to slant law school information. It is also fraught with uncertainty and the
potential for sub-optimal equilbria that inflate costs, mislead students, and
invite radical change in how law schools are accredited.
Although internal labor
markets have operated for decades within the legal academy, the advent of
rankings has given rise to a strong external market for law students. The internal labor market for law professors
is based on scholarly productivity, but the external market for students is
based on future employment prospects and value-added by individual law schools. Success in these markets require two very
different institutional strategies, and only a handful of schools—already at
the top of the food chain—have the resources to play them both.
Yet, law schools are run primarily by tenured faculty. This is a group with little practice or expertise in making hard choices that will be judged by market market forces. And rather than thinking through difficult
institutional issues, many legal academics have a strong incentive to just
focus on their scholarship in the hopes of landing a lateral offer at a place
with more resources and thus fewer problems--i.e., in the language of L&E, there is a collective
action problem.
To this group, yes, rankings scholarship can be dismissed as
a pastime. But even if positional
competition works well for many law professors in the short run, there are
serious structural limits to how long the current system can continue. For those interested in an orderly transition
to a new legal education marketplace that serves the interests of students, practicing
lawyers, and society, the serious study of rankings-cum-markets is an absolute necessity.
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