Judicial decision-making scholars will want to see Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, by Lee Epstein (Northwestern), Bill Landes (Chicago), and Richard Posner (CA7 & Chicago). In it, the authors "develops
and tests a model of self-interested judicial behavior to explore the
phenomenon of judicial dissents, and in particular what we call 'dissent aversion,' which sometimes causes a judge not to dissent even
when he disagrees with the majority opinion." An excerpted abstract follows.
"... In
the court of appeals, the frequency of dissents is negatively related
to the caseload and positively related to ideological diversity among
judges in the circuit and circuit size (i.e., the fewer the judges, the
greater the collegiality costs of dissenting and therefore, other
things being equal, the fewer dissents). We also find that dissents
increase the length of majority opinions (imposing collegiality costs
by making the majority work harder) and are rarely cited either inside
or outside the circuit (reducing the value of dissenting to
dissenters). In the Supreme Court, we find that the dissent rate is
negatively related to the caseload and positively related to
ideological differences, that majority opinions are longer when there
is a dissent and that dissents are rarely cited in either the courts of
appeals or the Supreme Court."
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