Contributing to special litigation committees' (SLCs) mixed reputation is that while SLCs are supposed to consider the merits of derivative litigation brought by shareholders against a company they are frequently composed of board members from the same company/board that is being sued. Accordingly, many corporate scholars hypothesize that SLCs are structurally inclined to dismiss the shareholders’ cases and operate solely to protect directors from liability.
In a recent paper, An Empirical Study of Special Litigation Committees: Evidence of Management Bias and the Effect of Legal Standards, C.N.V. Krishnan (Case Western--Finance), Steven D. Solomon (Berkeley), and Randall S. Thomas (Vanderbilt), drawing on sample of 384 publicly available SLC events spanning the 26-year period Jan 1, 1990 through Dec 31, 2015, "... empirically test the effectiveness and use of SLCs, the recommendations that they make in their reports, and how legal rules on the judicial review of those report affect case outcomes." The excerpted abstract summarizes the paper's key findings.
"We find evidence that SLC reports are most likely to recommend case dismissal, that such a recommendation is significantly and positively associated with the probability of the case being dismissed, and significantly and negatively associated with probability of case settlement, even after controlling for lawsuit reasons, legal standards, and time fixed effects. However, we find evidence that SLCs reports systematically underestimate the likelihood that cases will settle. We also find that SLC reports to dismiss are filed with significantly higher frequency when all defendants are current or former directors as compared to the rest of the cases, but actual dismissals occur with significantly higher frequency when any defendant is an entity other than the defendant firm as compared to all other cases, providing some evidence that SLCs tend to favor their fellow directors and officers. We also find that law matters for SLC outcomes: incorporation in Delaware and a lawsuit filed in Delaware courts are both significantly associated with a lower probability of the SLC report recommending dismissal of the case, and a motion to dismiss filed by a SLC. We find that actual case dismissals are the lowest amongst all jurisdictions in Delaware suits. In states with the lowest legal standards for SLC judicial review, SLC’s cases are more likely to be dismissed. Our findings highlight that, contrary to prior studies, there is evidence of SLC pro-management bias, and also highlight the importance of legal rules and judicial oversight of SLCs."
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