"Revolving doors," evidently, are everywhere. While in a few sectors (e.g., financial regulators/financial services industries) research on revolving doors is well-developed, empirical research in other sectors is less so. The latter sectors include, e.g., an individual's path from a Supreme Court clerkship, to an appellate litigation group, and then back to the Supreme Court as an advocate. While "hunches" about this "revolving door" have persisted over time, data on former clerks' efficacy arguing in front of their former bosses remain scant. A recent paper, The Influence of Personalized Knowledge at the Supreme Court: How (Some) Former Law Clerks Have the Inside Track, exploits decisions in the Supreme Court Database between the 1979 and 2018 Terms and contributes to this data void. In their paper, political scientists Ryan Black (Mich. St.) and Ryan Owens (Wisc.) find evidence of an effect as the following figure implies.
The paper's abstract, summarizing core results, follows.
"When arguing at the U.S. Supreme Court, former High Court law clerks enjoy significant influence over their former justices. Our analysis of forty years of judicial votes reveals that an attorney who formerly clerked for a justice is 16 percent more likely to capture that justice’s vote than an otherwise identical attorney who never clerked. What is more, an attorney who formerly clerked for a justice is 14 to 16 percent more likely to capture that justice’s vote than an otherwise identical attorney who previously clerked for a different justice. Former clerk influence is substantial, targeted, and appears to come from clerks’ personalized information about their justices. These results answer an important empirical question about the role of attorneys while raising normative concerns over fairness in litigation."
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