It was perhaps inevitable that the popular success of the HBO series, Succession, might, in turn, help stimulate scholarly attention to related associated questions. As it relates to critical questions germane to "family firms'" stock and accounting performances, the general thrust in the academic literature, while mixed, trends in a negative direction. In Do Family Successions (Really) Reduce Firm Performance? Evidence from Large US Firms, Murali Jagannathan (SUNY Binghamton-, management) et al., take a fresh look with the benefit of a large dataset that includes "48,613 firm-years in 3,745 unique firms. Within our dataset, there are 683 total founder or founder-family successions, including 124 instances where the founder was succeeded by a family member.”
Two research design challenges complicate such "family firm" studies. First, the decision to appoint a founding family member as CEO is not random. To address this selection challenge, the paper adopts "an instrumental variables approach using two instruments: whether someone with the same last name as the founder serves on the board within the three-year period preceding the succession, and whether or not the firm has a long history.” Second, systematic firm differences distinguish "founder, founder family, and non-family firms." To adjust, the authors adopt a propensity match strategy to compare "founder family firms with non-founder firms and examine the change in performance around founder successions relative to the matched firms.”
Notably, the paper finds "no significant decreases in either accounting performance or firm value, and instead find evidence that both are improved.” The authors lean on evidence that "family successions are associated with higher levels of employee trust" to help account for their findings. The paper's abstract follows.
"This paper examines whether founder family successions lower performance in large US firms. We find no significant decreases in either accounting performance or firm value, and instead find evidence that both are improved. Consistent with this, we present evidence that family successions are associated with higher levels of employee trust, and that employee’s human capital is not as easily transferable at family firms. Consistent with the literature, we find that the decision to appoint a founder family member as a successor CEO is not random, and occurs in low-growth, yet profitable firms. To mitigate these endogeneity problems, we first propensity match founder family firms with non-founder firms and examine the change in performance around founder successions relative to the matched firms. We also use two instruments of founder family successions in our analysis."
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