In a recent (and mercifully brief) review essay, Empirical Constitutional Studies (reviewing Adam Chilton & Mila Versteeg's How Constitutional Rights Matter (OUP, 2020)), Arthur Dyevre (KU Leuven Centre for Legal Theory and Empirical Jurisprudence) takes the occasion to opine more generally on ELS' recent (and growing) "intrusion" into the comparative constitutional law field.
When it comes to empirically assessing constitutions and constitutional rights, Dyevre is mindful of the obvious methodological challenges for empiricists. After all, "comparing countries, even when observed over many years, is difficult because each country is the abstraction of complex, intricate and often idiosyncratic social dynamics that, even in the best of circumstances, are only imperfectly tracked by available data." Moreover, even where high quality data do exist, other complications lurk. "Countries may differ in unobserved ways, which in turn may correlate with both institutional choices (adding or not a particular right to the constitution) and de facto observance of rights." Finally, empirical findings in comparative constitutional law studies are invariably based on observational data drawn from non-randomized research designs which limits opportunities for causal inference.
Despite these (and other) challenges, Dyevre's review of Chilton & Versteeg's work implies a level of optimism (if cautious) for empirical methodologies' ability to contribute to such fields as comparative constitutional law (particularly so for "mixed-methods" projects).
Comments