Empirical Legal Studies

Lay Understandings of Civil Settlements

When it comes to resolving formal civil disputes, popular imagination, partly fueled by the media and entertainment industry, is dominated by "courtroom drama" and jury trials. Empirical work over the decades, however, paints quite a different picture, and one dominated by the "disappearing trial." Thus, as Jennifer Robbennolt (Illinois) et al. make clear in Settlement Schemas: How Laypeople Understand Civil Settlement, "for all the attention paid to the real and imagined drama of the courtroom, these depictions overlook the reality of how many disputes are resolved: through any means but trial."

In the service of seeking a better understanding of how the public understands civil settlements, the authors surveyed a representative sample of more than 1,000 U.S. adults. Key findings include that while the public conveyed a widespread general understanding about civil settlements, evidence of misconceptions about the details, including the role of a jury and settlement scope, also emerged. The paper's abstract follows.

"What does the public think it means to ‘settle’ a civil case? Most legal disputes in the United States end in an agreement to settle, but little is known about what laypeople think about settlement. To fill this gap, we took a direct approach: we asked a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults – more than one thousand of them – basic questions about settlement. We found widespread understanding about the essential nature and frequency of settlement, but persistent, though not universal, misconceptions about the details, including the role of a jury and settlement scope. Because settlement is such a pervasive part of the U.S. legal system, the system’s legitimacy turns in part on how the public understands and views civil settlement. The survey reported here provides a foundational study of the understandings and framework – the schemas – that the public bring to settlement."

Sentencing as a Product of Plea Agreements

When it comes to explaining criminal sentences, conventional wisdom emphasizes either judges or, given that criminal convictions largely flow from negotiated plea agreements, prosecutors. A closer look, however, reveals far more nuance and complexity and a dynamic process involving multiple parties concurrently rather than a static event dominated by one actor.

In a recent "closer look," Jeffrey Bellin (William & Mary) & Jenia Turner (SMU) explore 77 plea bargains in the first half of 2019. Noting that comprehensive empirical work on judicial responses to negotiated plea deals is sparse, In Sentencing in an Era of Plea Bargains makes a few helpful contributions. First, the authors' deep dive into 77 pleas bargains, though descriptive, revels some initial, general contours of these agreements. Notably, while judges ultimately approved all of the 77 plea bargains in the paper's sample, judges departed from the negotiated sentencing recommendation in about one-third of the cases. Also notable is that in virtually all instances where the judge departed from the negotiated sentence, she did so in a direction that favored greater leniency. Second, in separate analyses the authors examine 31 plea agreements that elicited judicial rejections. Somewhat perplexingly, judges rejected most plea agreements (74%) because they felt the recommended sentence was too lenient.

Obviously, descriptive studies that lack statistical power are limited in important ways. At the same time, however, such studies can help by pointing future researchers in potential helpful directions. The paper's (excerpted) abstract follows.

“The literature offers inconsistent answers to a question that is foundational to criminal law: Who imposes sentences? Traditional narratives place sentencing responsibility in the hands of the judge. Yet, in a country where 95 percent of criminal convictions come from guilty pleas (not trials), modern American scholars center prosecutors – who control plea terms – as the decider of punishment. This Article highlights and seeks to resolve the tension between these conflicting narratives by charting the pathways by which sentences are determined in a system dominated by plea bargains.

After reviewing the empirical literature on sentence variation, state and federal plea-bargaining rules and doctrines, and conducting some empirical analysis of our own, we conclude that neither of the competing narratives is correct. Sentencing in the United States has become a dynamic process with substantial contributions from multiple actors, not a static event controlled by any single actor.”

How Summary Judgment Changes Vary Across Subject Areas

The Supreme Court upended summary judgment doctrine with a trilogy of cases in 1986. At the time--and largely persisting into current prevailing wisdom--it was assumed that the 1986 changes made summary judgment comparatively more available and, thus, of greater benefit to defendants. While empirical evidence remains somewhat scant, emerging findings paint a far more complex and nuanced picture.

A recent contribution to this research literature comes from Jonathan Nash (Emory) and Daniel Sokol (USC). In The Summary Judgment Revolution that Wasn't, the authors lever six separate (though related) datasets that draw from federal court decisions in three discrete areas (antitrust, civil rights, and securities regulation) and exploit the 1986 trilogy with pre- and post-intervention comparisons. At bottom, the paper finds "no evidence of the trilogy influencing summary judgment decision making in securities regulation, and at best mixed evidence of such an effect in civil rights cases. In contrast, we find that the trilogy did have a strong statistically significant effect on decision making in antitrust cases, at both the district court and court of appeals levels." The abstract follows.

"The U.S. Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases on summary judgment in 1986. Questions remain as to how much effect these cases have had on judicial decision making in terms of wins and losses for plaintiffs. Shifts in wins and losses and what cases get to decisions on the merits impact access to justice. We assemble novel datasets to examine this question empirically in three areas of law that are more likely to respond to shifts in the standard for summary judgment: antitrust, securities regulation, and civil rights. We find that the Supreme Court’s decisions had a statistically significant effect in antitrust, an ambiguous effect in civil rights cases, and no effect in securities regulation. We also find that, in the trilogy’s wake, antitrust appellate cases were far more likely to cite trilogy cases—and in particular the one trilogy case that was an antitrust case—than appellate cases in the other areas. This suggests that the lone trilogy case that arose in antitrust had an effect on decision making in that field, but that the trilogy had a limited effect across other substantive areas. This finding differs from Twombly and Iqbal where an antitrust decision ultimately reshaped the entire body of law around motions to dismiss."

Experimental Judicial Decisionmaking Studies & External Validity

For experimental judicial decisionmaking studies, the "gold-standard" research design includes using actual judges as participants. My Cornell colleague (and good friend) Jeff Rachlinski is a leading scholar in this space. For an array of reasons (including practical reasons), too much of the experimental research in this field is hampered by researchers' use of students (including law students) as the experimental participants. To the extant that researchers seek to generalize results from judicial decisionmaking studies to the "universe of judges," conventional  wisdom suggests that the use of students in these experiments raises important external validity questions.

Of course, such (and most) "conventional wisdoms" rest on empirical assumptions. And in a recent paper, Can Law Students Replace Judges in Experiments of Judicial-Making?, Holger Spamann (Harvard) and Lars Klohn (Humboldt) submit this question to an experiment. The answer to the question they pose in their paper's title?: "unfortunately, no." The paper's abstract follows.

"Experimental research on judicial decision-making is hampered by the difficulty of recruiting judges as experimental participants. Can students be used in judges’ stead? Unfortunately, no. We ran the same high-context 2×2 factorial experiment of judicial decision-making focused on legal reasoning with 31 U.S. federal judges and 91 elite U.S. law students. We obtained diametrically opposed results. Judges’ decisions were strongly associated with one factor (sympathy, i.e., bias) but not the other (law). For students, it was the other way around. Equality between the two groups is strongly rejected. Equality of document-view patterns—a proxy for thought processes—and written reasons is also strongly rejected."

Modeling Rare Events--SCOTUS Clerkships

Of the approximate 36,000 law school students who graduate each year, only 36 or so end up securing a SCOTUS clerkship. While a handful of biographical and anecdotal accounts exist, very few systematic data exist on the "1-in-1,000" clerkship lottery.

A recent paper by Tracey George (Vanderbilt), Albert Yoon (Toronto), and Mitu Gulati (Virginia), Some Are More Equal Than Others: U.S. Supreme Court Clerkship, digs into 40 years worth of data and provides rich granularity about this statistical rare event. In the main, while some unexpected twists emerge, what the authors find generally comports with perceived wisdoms. For example, a disproportionate number of clerks emerge from five elite law schools. One interesting change, however, is that while a SCOTUS clerkship once led "primarily to government and universities [law faculties]," former clerks now increasingly land at "law firms and corporations." An excerpted abstract follows.

"... Yet, we lack a clear story about who wins this clerkship lottery. This Essay seeks to provide that story. Our analysis relies on new datasets of all Court clerks who served between 1980 and 2020, including the details of their path to the Court and their road after. We amend and expand on theories of success in this important labor market. All clerks are highly qualified, yet the same is true for many not chosen. We find that educational pedigree, as opposed to academic performance or any other qualification, often distinguishes the winners from the also-rans. The Court clerkship selection process, like other elite labor markets, proves to be a blend of status and merit where status often prevails. Our analysis does not end there, however. We go on to look at where this forty-year cohort is currently working and confirm that once attained, a Court clerkship does lead to a bounty of opportunities including a return to the Court as a justice. Thus, the Court clerkship lottery is an important labor market not only to lawyers but also to society writ large. In the elite legal labor market, some people are, in fact, more equal than others."

More Evidence of a Racialized Death Penalty

Notably, race does not emerge as a central concern in the Court’s Furman decision, now more than fifty years old. In the decades since Furman, however, empirical evidence continues to mount documenting that "racial discrimination infects the administration of the death penalty." A recent paper by Jeffrey Fagan et al. (Columbia), Getting to Death: Race and the Paths of Capital Cases after Furman, represents a recent and important contribution to this literature. Researchers visited each judicial circuit in Georgia to record the details of every murder case that entered the courts from 1994–2005. Analyses of the 1,317 death-eligible murders suggest that “race continues to matter, and that the statutory aggravators that distinguish death cases from other killings are themselves racialized.” A more detailed description of the paper's core findings appears in the Abstract (below).

“Decades of research on the administration of the death penalty have recognized the persistent arbitrariness in its implementation and the racial inequality in the selection of defendants and cases for capital punishment. This Article provides new insights into the combined effects of these two constitutional challenges. We show how these features of post-Furman capital punishment operate at each stage of adjudication, from charging death-eligible cases to plea negotiations to the selection of eligible cases for execution and ultimately to the execution itself, and how their effects combine to sustain the constitutional violations first identified 50 years ago in Furman. Analyzing a dataset of 2,328 first- degree murder convictions in Georgia from 1995–2004 that produced 1,317 death eligible cases, we show that two features of these cases combine to produce a small group of persons facing execution: victim race and gender, and a set of case-specific features that are often correlated with race. We also show that these features explain which cases progress from the initial stages of charging to a death sentence, and which are removed from death eligibility at each stage through plea negotiations. Consistent with decades of death penalty research, we also show the special focus of prosecution on cases where Black defendants murder white victims. The evidence in the Georgia records suggests a regime marred less by overbreadth in its statute than capriciousness and randomness in the decision to seek death and to seek it in a racially disparate manner. These two dimensions of capital case adjudication combine to sustain the twin failures that produce the fatal lottery that is the death penalty.”

Judges' Financial Holdings, Case Outcomes, and Recusal

Fundamental to the notion of a fair trial and the rule of law is the principle that a judge shall apply the law impartially and free from the influence of any personal biases. When real or perceived conflicts of interest emerge, judges are expected to recuse themselves. Despite such an expectation, however, recent Wall Street Journal reporting revealed many cases where judges violated U.S. law and judicial ethics (28 U.S.C. Section 455) by overseeing cases that involve companies in which they or their family-owned stock. Unsurprisingly, several of the cases with conflicts have been appealed.

While Chief Justice John Roberts downplayed the significance of the Wall Street Journal reporting, characterizing the judges' failures to recuse as "isolated violations" and "unintentional oversights," empirical explorations of the potential influence of judges' financial holdings on case outcomes remain rare. To address this scholarly gap, a recent paper, Judge Financial Holdings and Case Outcomes: Evidence from Judge Financial Disclosures, examines whether there is a relation between the financial holdings of judges and the outcomes of the trials over which they preside.

To construct the judges' investment data set, Harit (Univ. Texas-Dallas—mgmt.) et al. extracted judge financial disclosure data from the Free Law Project website. Their sample includes 33,726 annual disclosure reports involving 3,250 federal judges from 2000 to 2020. The authors lever the random assignment of cases to judges and examine whether a judge's rulings are related to his or her stock ownership in one or more of the parties in the case. The paper finds robust evidence that judges rule more favorably and take longer when deciding over conflicted cases as compared to unconflicted ones. It also notes that investors are positively surprised by these outcomes. The abstract follows.

"This paper examines the association between a judge's financial holdings and the outcome of legal cases. Using novel data on financial disclosures of judges and the civil case information of public firms across district courts in the United States between 2000 and 2021, we document multiple instances in which judges fail to recuse themselves in cases where they hold common stock. We find robust evidence that judges rule more favorably and take longer when deciding over conflicted cases as compared to unconflicted ones. We also find that investors are positively surprised by these outcomes, as reflected by stock returns to trial outcomes. Collectively, our results provide the first large-scale evidence of the relation between judges' financial holdings and case outcomes."

Civilian Complaints Against Police & Prosecutor "Upcharging"

Citizens’ engagement with police serves as a valuable resource. One particular form of citizen engagement—civil complaints—can impose a serious cost to the targeted police officer as well as the police department. To try to reduce the potential negative effects of a citizen complaint against law enforcement agents, other criminal justice actors could act to re-frame the encounter such that the optics look unfavorably on the complaining citizen. Since a defendant cannot seek monetary damages in civil court unless his/her conviction or sentence was declared invalid, prosecutors may increase the number or the severity of charges that the defendant faces to propel the defendant toward accepting a plea deal, which would prevent the defendant from seeking further financial reparations. In a new paper, Do Civilian Complaints Against Police Get Punished?, DeAngelo (Claremont Colleges) et al. pursue this question empirically.

To do so, the authors examine arrest, complaint and charging data from Cook County (Illinois). The results indicate that a positive, causal link between citizen complaints and an increased number of total charges filed against a defendant exists. The paper also notes that a civilian complaint yields a larger plea discount, likely to induce a plea agreement. Notably, the main findings are entirely driven by charges filed directly by the prosecutor’s office rather than directly by the police. Given that prosecutors are likely filing charges after civilian complaints have been filed against law enforcement, it appears that prosecutor behavior is leading to upcharging in response to civilian complaints and not police decisions. An excerpted abstract follows.

“… This paper empirically investigates one way in which criminal justice institutions respond to civilian complaints. Namely, criminal prosecutors can upcharge a defendant who files a civil complaint against law enforcement. By upcharging, the prosecutor can increase the likelihood that a defendant will accept a plea deal, thus preventing the defendant from seeking monetary damages in civil court (Heck vs. Humphrey, 1994). Using data on citizen complaints and criminal charge outcomes from Cook County (Illinois), we find a strong causal link between a citizen filing a complaint and the total number of charges filed.”

Theory's Role in ELS

A not infrequent, though diminishing, canard is that "too many" empirical legal studies papers are "atheoretical." While the claim itself is an empirical one (and one that I side-step), a larger, broader point endures. Specifically, the best of ELS is certainly informed by well-developed theory. In a recent paper, The Role of Theory in Empirical Legal Studies, Tonja Jacobi (Emory) makes this case in a brief and widely accessible paper. While perhaps targeted to "early career" ELS scholars and non-technical consumers of empirical research, the paper helpfully reminds all of theory's essential role in empirical legal studies. The paper's abstract follows.

"The growing field of empirical legal studies is not an alternative to theory: within every empirical inquiry is an implicit formal theoretical model. Further, good empirical tests should be inspired by substantive theories of the phenomena being analyzed. This essay explains how theory is built into all empirical testing and illustrates why empirical tests are best informed by well-developed theories. It uses examples of empirical studies of both US Supreme Court and Australian High Court oral argument to illustrate how these issues apply to the central issues at the intersection of empirical legal studies and constitutional law: the role of judicial ideology and strategy, and predicting judicial behavior. The essay explores common errors in both conducting and consuming empirical work, and presents some solutions, including both methodological fixes and how to draw on substantive expertise. It aims to help the non-technical reader understand when counterintuitive results should be queried and when, in contrast, resistance is more reflective of priors of the reader rather than potential weaknesses of the work. And it acts as a reminder to technical readers and empirical practitioners that theory is built into every empirical test, and so must be taken seriously."

Case Outcomes & Judge Financial Conflicts

To assist with insuring that "justice is blind," a presiding judge is expected to recuse from any case where he/she is financially conflicted with any of the litigating parties. Evidence that this expectation is not being consistently met was widely reported in 2020-2021. Indeed, the public controversy elicited a response from Chief Justice John Roberts. In his 2021 annual report on the federal judiciary, and in direct response to the controversy surrounding numerous federal judges, Chief Justice Roberts downplayed the controversy’s significance, characterizing the incidents as "isolated violations" and "unintentional oversights."

Notwithstanding Justice Roberts' characterizations, given the widespread implications posed by judges' failures to recuse when proper it is important to understand whether these recent episodes are one-time incidents or point to a larger, systemic problem. To address this question, in a recent paper, Judge Financial Holdings and Case Outcomes: Evidence from Judge Financial Disclosures, Tuhin Harit (Univ. Dallas--Mgmt.) et al. examine whether there is a relation between judges' disclosed financial holdings and the outcomes of the trials over which they presided.

Drawing from a sample that includes cases from 2000–2021, the paper finds that “stock ownership by judges significantly improves the chances of a litigant's winning a case.” In cases where the presiding judge is financially conflicted with either the defendant or plaintiff, “their chance of a favorable decision improves by 3.3% and 4.3%, respectively, after controlling for judge, industry, district, case file year, and firm characteristics.” An excerpted abstract follows.

"... Using novel data on financial disclosures of judges and the civil case information of public firms across district courts in the United States between 2000 and 2021, we document multiple instances in which judges fail to recuse themselves in cases where they hold common stock. We find robust evidence that judges rule more favorably and take longer when deciding over conflicted cases as compared to unconflicted ones. We also find that investors are positively surprised by these outcomes, as reflected by stock returns to trial outcomes. Collectively, our results provide the first large-scale evidence of the relation between judges' financial holdings and case outcomes.”

The Empirics of Choice of Law

In an effort to peer into judicial decisionmaking more generally, a recent paper by Dan Klerman (USC), Bias in Choice of Law: New Empirical and Experimental Evidence, levers both observational and experimental data drawn from the vehicle accident context to examine choice of law disputes. The paper considers three leading sources of choice of law bias: pro-resident, pro-plaintiff, and forum law. The findings intrigue and complicate prevailing conventional wisdoms.

Specifically, core findings include that while judges seem to favor the plaintiff, judge decisions do not tilt in favor of application of the law they are most familiar with (the law of the forum). While state court judges favor local residents, federal court judges do not. Although the traditional “place of the injury” choice-of-law rule was more constraining than modern American choice-of-law standards (such as the Restatement Second), even judges under the traditional rule favored the plaintiff more often than seemed warranted. The abstract follows.

"Scholars have argued that modern American choice-of-law is subject to three biases: (1) a bias in favor of residents of the forum state (pro-resident bias), (2) a bias in favor of plaintiffs (pro-plaintiff bias), and (3) a bias in favor of the law of the forum (forum law bias). This article brings new evidence about these biases from a comprehensive database of vehicular accident cases and from the first experiment related to choice of law. Overall, there is some evidence of a pro-resident bias in state (but not federal) court, some evidence of pro-plaintiff bias in both federal and state court, and no evidence of a pro-forum bias."

Business Litigants and the Roberts Court

Assessing “How pro business is the Roberts Court?” is both straightforward and complicated. Based on how business litigants fare in the Roberts Court versus non-business litigants over time, business does quite well. The win rate for business in the Roberts Court, 63.4 percent, is 15 percentage points higher than the next highest rate of business wins over the past century (the Rehnquist Court, at 48.3 percent). While it may be tempting for many to conclude that the current pro business tilt is purely a function of a Republican majority of justices on the Roberts Court, as Lee Epstein (USC) and Mitu Gulati (Virginia) argue in a recent paper, A Century of Business in the Supreme Court, 1920-2020, “this is only the beginning of the story.”

Epstein and Gulati bring data from the Supreme Court Database to the question. Starting with the 11,121 orally argued cases resulting in a signed opinion or judgment between the 1920-2020 terms, their paper focuses only on those 4,070 cases (35,173 votes) in which business was the petitioner (appellant) or respondent (appellee). That is, they excluded cases in which business was on both sides of a legal dispute.

Their core findings defy conventional wisdom and inject important complicating wrinkles. What they find includes: "(a) It is not just the Republicans on the Roberts Court who are more pro business than in prior Courts, but the Democrats as well; (b) The Government, through the SG’s office and across both Democratic and Republican administrations, has been much more supportive of business positions than in prior eras; and (c) An elite Supreme Court bar has emerged in recent years and businesses have hired them disproportionately so as to better influence the Court."

Empirical Contours of the Political Question Doctrine

Amid the enduring and varied debates about the political question doctrine, motivated by the Supreme Court's 1962 Baker v. Carr decision, the scholarly commentary shares one key attribute. Specifically, it dwells on the Supreme Court. Such a focus is ironic as while the Court has only rarely applied the political question doctrine, lower federal courts, by contrast, have invoked the doctrine "as a basis for dismissal in hundreds of cases." Drawing on both qualitative and quantitative (descriptive) methods, in a recent paper, The Real Political Question Doctrine, Curtis Bradley (Chicago) and Eric Posner (Chicago) explore how the political question doctrine has operated in the lower courts since the Supreme Court's Baker decision.

The authors find that lower courts use the doctrine to "evaluate their own institutional capacity to resolve politically sensitive disputes. It is the lower courts’ more limited capacity compared to the Supreme Court that explains the lower courts’ heavier reliance on the doctrine." More specifically, "the political question doctrine is a screening mechanism that the lower courts use to take account of limits on their institutional capacity. The Supreme Court has less need for this mechanism, so most of the doctrine’s life must be found in the foothills rather than at the summit of Mount Olympus. From this standpoint, the doctrine is not moribund but full of life. It is not limited in the ways suggested by the 'classical' or 'functional' theories. The lower court practice is best captured by Bickel’s prudential theory." An excerpted abstract follows.

"... We provide the first empirical account of how the doctrine has operated in the lower courts since Baker. Our account is based on both a quantitative analysis of a sample of these decisions and on a qualitative review of these and other decisions. This account reveals a political question doctrine that is substantially different from the one described in most scholarship: it is more vibrant, heavily focused on foreign affairs, often applied in non-constitutional cases, more prudential, and not a permanent disallowance of judicial review...."

Algos and Parole Decisions

Many--if not most--parole decisions remain fraught with peril. As parole boards are tasked with, to some degree, "guessing into the future," some form of risk assessment has been used to inform parole decisions since the 1920s. Despite this legacy, a recent and growing "decarceration" push has heightened public and scholarly attention to criminal risk prediction instruments. Recently, New York state amended its parole law to "center [parole board] decisions on individual’s rehabilitation in prison and future risk if released." Despite this shift in law, critics continue to argue that parole boards, such as New York's, "continue to incarcerate individuals well beyond their minimum sentence, not out of concern for public safety, but because of the nature and severity of the offense that had sent them to prison."

While concerns grow, few empirical estimates of the issue exist. In a recent paper, An Algorithmic Assessment of Parole Decisions, the authors, Hannah Laqueur (UC Davis--medicine) and Ryan Copus (Univ. Mizzou--KC), endeavor to do just that and test a risk-prediction algorithm. To do so, the paper paper exploits New York parole hearings’ data from 2012-2018. The data include individual sex, race/ethnicity, commitment crime, housing facility, parole board interview type, and the interview decision. The authors also obtained criminal history records for all individuals who had a recorded parole hearing from 2012 through 2018. The authors' risk prediction algorithm trained on the 4,168 individuals who were released on parole between 2012 and 2015 (a total of 19,713 individuals had parole hearings during this period). The primary outcome variables include "any recorded arrest within three years post-release and any violent felony arrest within three years post-release."

The authors find that the New York parole board "could have granted parole more than twice as often without increasing either the overall or violent arrest rate, or it could have released the same number of people while approximately halving both overall and violent arrest rates. Further, we find that they could have achieved these gains while simultaneously eliminating racial disparities in release rates.” The authors take care to note that they "cannot determine whether the Board is simply not as good at determining risk as our risk prediction algorithm, or is simply prioritizing non-risk related factors such as the commitment offense." The paper's abstract follows.

"Objectives: Parole is an important mechanism for alleviating the extraordinary social and financial costs of mass incarceration. Yet parole boards can also present a major obstacle, denying parole to low-risk inmates who could safely be released from prison. We evaluate a major parole institution, the New York State Parole Board, quantifying the costs of suboptimal decision-making.

Methods: Using ensemble Machine Learning, we predict any arrest and any violent felony arrest within three years to generate criminal risk predictions for individuals released on parole in New York from 2012–2015. We quantify the social welfare loss of the Board’s sub-optimal decisions by rank ordering inmates by their predicted risk and estimating the crime rates that could be observed with counterfactual risk-based release decisions. We also estimate the release rates that could be achieved holding arrest rates constant. We attend to the “selective labels” problem in several ways, including by testing the validity of the algorithm for individuals who were denied parole but later released after the expiration of their sentence.

Results: We conservatively estimate that the Board could have more than doubled the release rate without increasing the total or violent felony arrest rate, and that they could have achieved these gains while simultaneously eliminating racial disparities in release rates.

Conclusions: This study demonstrates the use of algorithms for evaluating criminal justice decision-making. Our analyses suggest that many low risk individuals are being unnecessarily incarcerated, highlighting the need for major parole reform."

Judges Without J.D.s: One First Step

In an intriguing paper, Judging Without a J.D., the authors, Sara Greene (Duke) and Kristen Renberg (Duke), emphasize an underappreciated point: In a surprising number of states lower-level state court judges do not possess the J.D. degree. Now, to be sure, even at the federal level, the J.D. degree is not required for an Art. III commission. That said, insofar as virtually every (if not every) Art.III judge today possesses a J.D. the necessary variation does not exist to support useful comparative studies.

Research not possible in the federal judicial space, however, is possible in the state judicial space. And this paper does a good job at identifying a potentially rich vein of future research possibilities. Implications from this paper's brief case study of North Carolina magistrates (where more than 80 percent do not possess the J.D. degree) hint at possible distributional concerns. And these concerns may be especially acute where non-JD magistrates intersect with pro se litigants (itself a growing trend). The paper's abstract follows.

"One of the most basic assumptions of our legal system is that when two parties face off in court, the case will be adjudicated before a judge who is trained in the law. This Essay begins by showing that empirically, the assumption that most judges have legal training does not hold true for many low-level state courts. Using data we compiled from all fifty states and the District of Columbia, we find that thirty-three states allow at least some low-level state court judges to adjudicate without a law degree, and in seventeen states, judges who adjudicate eviction cases are not required to have law degrees. Since most poor litigants are unrepresented in civil legal cases, this sets up an almost Kafkaesque scene in courtrooms across the country: Legal cases that have a profound effect on poor families, such as whether they will lose their home to eviction, are argued either in courtrooms where no one knows the law or only one party---the lawyer for the more powerful party---knows the law.

Considering data collected from a case study of North Carolina, where over 80% of magistrates do not have J.D.s, this Essay argues that allowing a system of nonlawyer judges perpetuates long-standing inequalities in our courts. It further argues that the phenomenon of lay judges is a symptom of a much larger problem in our justice system: the devaluation of the legal problems of the poor, who are disproportionately Black and Latine. This devaluation stems in part from an enduring cultural history in the United States of blaming the poor for their poverty and the associated problems of poverty. A change is in order, one that intentionally considers the expertise of judges and adopts creative solutions to incentivize specially qualified adjudicators to serve as low-level state court judges."